Open letter to the UK public on the issue of serious corruption in the UK system, 3rd February 2020

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To: The public of the UK

Highlighting serious corruption in the UK system (2018-2020)

Dear public of the UK,

Today I am making public a big set of material which, I believe, acts as irresistible evidence of the existence of the network of serious corruption in the regional UK police force which has affected and attacked me and my UK FCA-licensed business, causing its full destroying. I do believe that this network is a result of precursor conditions which were a culture of nepotism and tolerance in this regional police force of the UK to what is called “noble corruption” and to any other, more sinister types of corruption arising from it.

The material I am making public today is available in form of the posts in my blog https://ukpolicecorruption.net created specifically for this purpose. Those posts, including the current one, have cross-links to each other. For the ease of access, I have also placed the content of my current post in the form of a PDF file. I am currently outside of the UK but plan to visit it during near time to facilitate the publicity of the case I am describing here. I am reachable by the e-mail president@aaappp.org.uk.

Before I continue, I need to state two important safeguards.

The first safeguard is that any allegation made by me is not yet proved by any tribunal even on the balance of probabilities and remains ‘merely’ my belief which I share now publicly, accompanying it by what I believe to be irresistible evidence. However, it will be also fair to say that such state of things exists because no one ever investigated the serious corruption irresistible evidence of which I have provided on multiple occasions since 17th April 2019 when I filed my first complaint against Merseyside Police, a regional police force of the UK.

My complaints highlighting the network of serious corruption in Merseyside Police were made to Merseyside Police itself and by unsurprising coincidence it was rejecting to investigate the group of its own officers, which included two officers in the rank of Detective Chief Inspector: instead, my complaints were stonewalled for 8 months by the ‘anti-corruption’ department of the Force (Professional Standards Department, “PSD”). In the absence of any reaction from PSD, my further undertaken steps and observations after my first complaint of 17th April 2019 allowed me to conclude that this cover up of serious corruption has so deep roots that the whole management of the force, including Assistant Chief Constable (“ACC”), Deputy Chief Constable (“DCC”) and Chief Constable of Merseyside Police (“CCMP”), is likely a part of the enabling system of serious corruption in this police force. When stating that there is a network of serious corruption in Merseyside Police, I state so as my belief, inviting everyone to make their own judgement based on the irresistible and obvious evidence that I provide: that evidence was ignored by Merseyside Police’s PSD and the management of the Force; my attempts to get justice, impartiality and fairness were stonewalled, deliberately put under the carpet. Because Merseyside Police as a whole – both PSD and the management of the Force – have ignored the irresistible evidence supplied to them, I feel it the only right way for me to put that evidence publicly, calling them for the public accountability over their reckless ignorance to and cover up of the issue of serious corruption I have highlighted to them, naïvely thinking that the management of the Force will be shocked by it and will take an action. What I have seen instead was, at best, full ignorance (from Deputy Chief Constable and Chief Constable) and direct cover up
from Assistant Chief Constable, who directly claimed to me that what I have supplied him with is “fully in line with the high standards he sets for his teams” (in his official letter dated 21st November 2019). I do believe that the public deserves to know ‘the high standards’ of people who are currently occupying the office of the management of Merseyside Police. For that purpose, I have prepared the document called "Evidence of serious corruption in Merseyside Police: 2018-2020".

The second safeguard, and probably, most important one, is that despite of all what I assert in my today’s disclosures and messages about the serious corruption’s network in Merseyside Police, I still do believe that the UK’s system of law enforcement (including 43 police forces) is the best, or one of the best in the world, as is the UK’s system of justice as a whole. Where I assert that I have observed the network of serious corruption, I do so in relation to isolated case, which is believed by me to be a “bad apple”, on the one hand, and being present in much bigger extent in other countries, by that very same reason that the UK’s system is one of the best, on the other hand. Where one sees number of corrupt officers in the UK system, he should expect to see much bigger number in the other countries where the anti-corruption legislation and infrastructure are much less developed. In fact, much of what I am disclosing today, could never be discovered and highlighted by me without that anti-corruption infrastructure and safeguards. I do believe that in my case each and every safeguard and body has rather failed than not. In case of PSD, the management of the police force and the Independent Office for Police Conduct – on the wholesale basis. Such things may happen when it comes to practical implementation of the well-thought system’s rules by humans who happen to have prejudice. At the same time, the ability to fixate that failure of the properly existent safeguards is what makes my public message possible in the format where not only can I say that “police officers lying to the court is bad but no one cares” but also, for example, I can nail down the management of the police force - the failed safeguard - to the regulations and internal policies (including the internal policy of Merseyside Police), the Code of Ethics of the UK Police, all of which are official documents, and all of which are outrageously ignored and contravened. This makes me able to bring up the injustice issue in a very explicit format where I can refer corrupt or ignorant authorities to the regulations and procedures proving they are wrong not simply on the over-arching basis of “doing so obviously wrong thing can’t be right” but even formally, highlighting violation of their own procedures, which they have sworn to follow and obey with.

‘Statjudice’ against prejudice

It is plain that the world is full of prejudices, and those are not always born purely out of malice and bad intent. As much of the content of my messages will be read through the prism of prejudice arising from such possible labels such as “a Russian businessman” and “a man opposing to the UK Police”, I see it inevitable to put the issue of prejudice into the explicit logical context.

I do believe that prejudice sometimes is a product of logically viable (mainly, statistical) analysis and can be used for practical purposes. But, at the same time, wrong applying of the desire to forecast or guess something (which wrong applying is unfortunately happening way too often) is discrediting the whole idea of such way of analysis.

In fact, there should be a clear separating line between the two types of prejudices: the statistical prejudice - let me call it ‘statjudice’ - and the subjective prejudice. The subjective prejudice is based on someone’s belief into something without logical and / or statistical reasons for that and represents an absolute evil, by which reasons I will not discuss it here.

Instead, I want to explain my understanding of the ‘statjudice’ and the risks arising from applying even this type of forecasting of the future / guessing the past behavior of people.
The 'statjudice' is what is based on bullet-proof logic, on the statistic and can be used in practice in some category of situations. By way of an abstract example, if there are two different areas of the city – area A and area B, and they have drastically different statistics of knife attacks occurrences on the streets during the last three months – for example, 50 attacks in area A and 5 attacks in area B, it is statistically and logically correct to say that there can be expectation of bigger level of knife attacks on the streets of the area A in the nearest time. It would be a waste of public funds for a police force to allocate the same patrolling manpower to both areas in ignorance of such sound statistical data. It is, thus, logically correct to send more patrols to the area A, because it will be much more efficient and beneficial for the public. The danger of statistical prejudice is where, albeit being based on statistically correct basis, it can be applied on personalized rather than large scale basis: while it is logically correct to send more officers to the area A, it is unfair and unjust to consider every person walking in that area A being more likely to be a knife attacker because, when it is applied on the level of personal approach, it is unfair to the affected person once an officer starts interacting with that person and has ability to make observations of his behaviour, of his reaction and other material signs which – for the purposes of fairness – must be considered irrelevantly of the fact that statistically it is 10 times more probable in the area A to meet a dangerous person than in the area B.

The blind and unfair prejudice occurs when, after sending bigger number of patrolling officers to the area A (which is a correct, non-personalized logical operational decision), the police allows these officers to apply prejudice – however statistically viable it may be on the large scale – to the people on the streets in full ignorance of whatever factors can be observed by them when dealing personally with each particular person. A person facing blind, acting in full ignorance of any personalizing factors, out of prejudice, public servant, is subject of an extreme unfairness. It is all the more so when operational decisions are being made in relation to multi-million accounts and can destroy businesses and drastically change the lives by subsequent desire to disguise and 'reverse-justify' the initial unfair decisions made out of the blind prejudice. It is especially so when such decisions resulted into steps which amounted to committal of serious criminal offences by the police officers themselves.

To conclude on the issue of prejudice, I do believe that as long as a form of forecast of pattern of behaviour by a group of people analysed under a legitimate and ethical criterion of unification - place of living, financial situation, education etc. – is based on statistically sound data, it can be used for the purposes of the public interest and that can be done without detriment to justice. At the same time, there is a sharp boundary between applying statistically sound forecast to where one can legitimately expect to see the statistics, operating with grouped rather than personalized data, and between applying statistical expectation as a justification to ignore and turn a blind eye on material and plainly observable factors where personalized approach is perfectly possible and expected.. Where prejudice replaces all other forms of analysis in decision making in the presence of observable personalized factors, it transforms such decision making into a mockery, fabrication of the analysis, usually done for the purposes of saving own time and efforts of a decision maker. The more invasive is the resulting step of a decision making process, the higher should be the watermark separating what can be called a legitimate large-scale statistical approach ('statjudice') and what is blind, inappropriate prejudice. In general case, where a decision maker can observe any personalizing factors, it would logically mean that the judgement cannot anymore be made on the basis of whatever statistically sound forecasting because the more sound is statistical data, the more unfairness will be to the person who did nothing wrong but is addressed simply because the others, considered (erroneously or not) to be similar to him by some criterion, did.
I explain the above in a hope that it will allow me to escape all those labels, which may start flying around me, and arising from them prejudice: providing irresistible evidence of serious corruption of the police officers I give ability to judge about the situation on merits, rather than on any prejudice.

Applying efforts of eliminating future prejudice, do I think that I have become subject of malicious attack because of prejudice against Russians? I certainly do, albeit, admittedly, this is something that will be extremely difficult to prove - unlike with the obvious misconduct and corruption of the officers concerned. But neither do I need to prove the prejudice against Russians being a motive of a malicious corrupt attack against me: such attack is still gross misconduct; those officers performing it and those allowing the cover up of it are still offenders as long as the fact of misconduct itself is proved or even simply forms prima facie basis for the recusal of the concerned officers from their 'duties'. As far as the motivation of that misconduct is concerned, I leave the third-party observers to make their own judgements in the presence of the following facts:

- a) The malicious attack against me started in April 2018, amidst spy poisoning scandal outset when all British media were full of, let say, content suggesting 'being not overly impressed' by Russians.
- b) I provide irresistible evidence of misleading the courts under oath by police officers making ex parte (without notice to me and without my knowledge) applications, as also irresistible evidence of anti-corruption body of the Force and the management of the Force blatantly covering that up.
- c) Much of the factors, observed by the officers and objectively mitigating against their suspicions or, let alone, filing such misleading applications. Those factors included my business footprints (e.g. sponsorship of Liverpool Football Club), ownership of financial regulated businesses in different jurisdictions (including two countries of EU) and were simply ignored – and, of course, withheld from the court, when the assertion of me selling a fake airline ticket to Nigeria for £750 was made. This is plainly an indication of 'self-blinding' prejudice where the desire to believe into something is so strong that it simply rewrites the reality for those who are acting when being affected by it.
- d) It was so ‘romantic’ for police officers in deprived – as compared to London – from dealing with large financial flows Liverpool, to spring on a case with a Russian businessman who looked for them being pavid and very afraid to come to the UK (due to 2 years of inexplicable for them absence caused by my serious illness, which they did not know about).

It is possible there was no discrimination caused by prejudice. May be, they always lie to the courts even when the applications relate to non-Russians. In fact, my further discoveries (obtaining further 10 ex parte applications for Production Orders) plainly suggest the culture of routine misleading of the courts in ex parte applications by in Merseyside Police's Economic Crime Team. Or, may be, they lie to the courts always but did much more rampant lying in my case because they perceived me to be a 'Russian', amidst spy poisoning scandal of March-April 2018. It does not matter much why they lied to the courts. It matters that they did, and I provide in a separated post what I believe to be irresistible evidence of that, which, simultaneously, also represents irresistible evidence of cover-up of that by the whole vertical of Merseyside Police, including the three highest ranks of the Force, against whom I have now also filed official complaints for being mixed up in serious corruption.

**I am not a Russian**

If I have become a target of corrupt attack because of prejudice against Russians, it would be extremely frustrating for the officers concerned to learn / know that I am, in fact, not a
Russian – I am a Tatar. There is – among tens of others – such an ethnicity in Russia. If that helps somehow to fight with prejudice, neither of my grandmothers knew Russian language (they spoke Tatar language). There are tens of ethnicities of Russia, at least twenty of which are concentrated in national republics (the official name of a county) with own constitution and, until last years, own president (de facto a governor), albeit that has become much of an imitation of federation approach as the country has become a unitary state in the last two decades. As of January 2020 Tatarstan is the only region in Russia in which governor’s position is still called “president”.

The word “Russian” in the sense of ethnicity and the word meaning “a person living in Russia” are two different words in Russian language, with the latter meaning having almost exclusive prevalence by the simple reason that up to a half of Russia’s population are not Russians, and calling people by their ethnicity is usually having a negative context and is an inappropriate thing in communications. I believe, it is the same for any country.

At the same time, I truly hope that allows me to qualify to be not dealing with label of a “Russian businessman”. For those rejecting to disown prejudice approach for personalized cases and who cannot digest assertion that “a Russian businessman has discovered network of serious corruption in a UK police force” I invite to replace “Russian” by “Tatar”.

Concluding my defence against being a person pre-definitely not deserving serious attention to his words due to having born in Russia and having Russian passport and Russian-looking last name, I want to underscore that I am 32 years old and of these 32 years the last 8 (almost 9) years I do not live in Russia, having not spent there even a day, and I also have a EU passport.

**How it all started**

In 2014 I planned to move my family to the UK because, same with now, albeit with a bigger sense of naivety and certain level of what I would call a blind trust, I believed this country to be a country of one of the highest available standards of Rule of Law, good infrastructure and climate. At that time I had no EU passport and thus applied for the entrepreneur visa.

Moving to another country is not an easy and fast task when you have a family as it requires certain level of personal preparations. Those preparations took two years and were finalized in 2016. During that time, in order to not lose my visa, I visited UK for three months in 2014, to open a local bank account for my entrepreneur visa as there was requirement of £200,000 investment to the UK company registered for that purpose. During these three months I opened the corporate account, transferred the required £200,000 and also opened – for future use – the personal bank accounts with UK banks.

One and a half years later, when the plan to move to the UK was finalized, in March 2016 I arranged transfer of more than £3 million to these personal UK-bank accounts of me as the final part of my arrangements to move my family to the UK: monies transferred before the beginning of tax residency would be tax exempt (it would be extravagant to pay in the UK 45% tax from monies earned before the start of tax residency, as any reasonable person would conclude), hence the transfer in March 2016 as 2016/17 financial year was the year when I planned to move my family to the UK.

It so happened that the plan to move to the UK in that year (2016) was postponed due to personal - again, family-related – circumstances. However, as the money was already transferred, I retained it in the UK, subsequently transferring around £2 million to the brokerage account of me and leaving around £1 million on my personal bank accounts in the
UK banks, as the plan to move to the UK was not cancelled and it had not much sense to move monies back and forth.

In January 2015 the FCA granted licence to another my UK company, which was a payment company called Online Currency Corp. After grant of the licence it took more than 6 months to obtain the first bank accounts and prepare the IT platform. The business started operating in the second half of 2015 under the registered brand name MegaTransfer, with the main specialization being offering the e-money accounts with a function of sending and receiving bank transfers. The similar business model is being used by appeared later Revolut and Bank N26 who managed to reach multi-billion capitalization. Being less lucky, instead of multi-billion capitalization, I reached a major disaster for my life, as result of facing what I believe to be a serious corruption's network in Merseyside Police of the UK, not least because I had preferred the main city of Merseyside – Liverpool – to London when staying in the UK and opening my bank accounts back in 2014. By that time I did not know that it can be so dangerous as compared to London. At that time, I could not imagine in the scariest nightmare the outrageous ‘high standards’ of Merseyside Police.

My last travel to the UK before outbreak of the malicious attack against me in April 2018 by members of that police force was in July-August 2016, after which I left the UK, leaving monies on the UK bank accounts. After August 2016 I stopped any traveling due to suffering from the onset of my autoimmune disease called Ankylosing Spondylitis (“AS”). This considerably rare disease affects 1 out of 150 in the population and activates itself – mainly in men – in late twenties, which is quite a nasty thing to discover for an otherwise healthy person, being put all of sudden into the every-day torture of often unbearable pains traveling throughout different joints of the body. Beside bringing enormous pains, the disease is – as with most autoimmune diseases – incurable and progressing. It took me almost 2 years to get it under control, by way of learning, researching and experimenting: I have chosen not to take any medications, and, unsurprisingly, there is zero commercial (and even academic) information how to deal with AS without medications, many of which are quite heavy and have side effects looking to be serious for someone who plans to live longer than 50 years. There are, however, very helpful non-commercial websites on AS issue which helped me to find way to “put it to bed” by way of changes in diet and in daily routine.

Because it took 2 years – since 2016 – to handle issues with my appeared as a sudden personal force majeure autoimmune disease and, as result, I stopped traveling to the UK for 2 years (visiting it in each of the years 2014, 2015 and 2016 for one to three months, including two times in 2016), my monies on my personal UK bank accounts appeared to be abandoned for a third party observer.

It is extremely abnormal for me to describe my personal circumstance to someone, let alone my health issue in a message directed to unlimited public. However, because I was attacked due to having my disease and the resulted from it ‘inexplicable absence’ in the UK where I left substantial monies in bank accounts, I continuously underscore that circumstance both in my complaints / letters to Merseyside Police and in my current public message. I do faithfully believe that it is my very personal business which diseases I have and why and where I travel, when and why I do not travel etc. However because I have become a target of malicious attack with the usage the of power of the state because of these personal circumstances, I have no choice but to describe these circumstances in details, to make it explicitly clear how ‘noble corruption’ sometimes makes very disgraceful and ugly slips: the corrupt officers were thrilled by observing me leaving monies in the UK and stopping travelling for 2 years; they also could see from my communications with the UK banks that at least one bank, in response to my enquiry about my account, asked me to visit the branch with my passport (as part of their standard procedure) to access the account, which I, residing in thousands of miles and having onset of serious autoimmune disease, could not
do. The corrupt police officers were thrilled by that: a Russian is afraid to visit the branch of the bank, millions of pounds are left by him unattended for years. It was so romantic, thrilling in the time where all major UK media were floating in the stories about Russian spy poisoning scandal and how ‘Russians are using the UK financial system’. There were, of course, very serious counter indications which did not match their desired belief of conspiracy – such as me having prominent and plainly observable by them business footprints, websites, sponsorship of the Liverpool Football Club – their hometown Football team, by the way. But because temptation always wins in noble corruption, they had overstepped those ‘not matching’ details: it was extremely thrilling for them to check what would be the reaction of a ‘damn Russian’ to the application to an English court in which they would explicitly inform the person, who was appearing to them being afraid to visit the bank’s branch, that he is challenged now by the UK police, not merely by a bank officer and that there is a criminal investigation against him.

The case started unfolding when, after 8 months of silent observation of my UK bank accounts, the outrageously misleading £1.577 million Account Freezing Order (“AFO”) applications were prepared and filed by the members of Merseyside Police’s Economic Crime Team (“MPECT”) to the Magistrates’ Court ex parte on 23rd April 2018 in relation to 4 my personal bank accounts in the UK and one bank account of my UK company. The applications were extremely misleading, representing simply a fabrication from A to Z. The most salient points of misleading by MPECT within that application are presented in the document “Evidence of serious corruption in Merseyside Police: 2018-2020”. Besides fabricating the AFO applications themselves, MPECT also sent the AFO notice for my 4 personal bank accounts to non-existent address, by entering my date of birth instead of building’s number in the address. It looked like that:

But that is not all from the category ‘kindergarten-level cheating’ of the police officers possessing the power of the state. In May 2018, after being contacted by my staff, MPECT - no doubt, to create impression of a ‘large-scale investigation’, sent a list of non-existent transactions for commenting. They have ignored since then each and every reminder about those ‘transactions’. That is the level of Merseyside Police, 2018. Officers who allow themselves act in such a ludicrous, kindergarten-level manner, make now very serious faces for the second year in a row and state “they have very serious concerns over regulatory compliance of my regulated UK payment business”. Coincidentally, doing so allowed them to have immunity from investigation into their conduct. So far, after interacting with them for more than 1.5 years, I was unable to clarify why those “serious concerns” appeared only after them having filed a wholly fabricated application to the court which stated I – the person who, they knew, sponsors Liverpool Football Club – sold a fake airline ticket to Nigeria for £750 and why would police officers, performing s supposedly serious investigation, commit such a low-level and disgraceful cheating with sending account freeze notices to a non-existent address by artificially creating it. Neither is it clear why performing a supposedly serious investigation one needs to rampanlty lie to the courts on every single occasion.

If you are a police officer and you realise you have seriously ‘cocked up’ something – it is very smart to make a very serious face to the victim and say “I have very serious concerns over you”. Because you certainly do have. But what are those serious concerns? And the answer is...

**Police officers of Merseyside Police may have committed imprisonable criminal offences**

I need to state it explicitly clear, for those who may have no legal background, that a police officer lying to the court is a police officer committing the criminal offences of perjury and perverting the course of justice, as also the criminal offence of improper/corrupt exercise of
police powers and privileges. Albeit the criminal offence of perjury in practice rarely results in the sentences bigger than 2-3 years, the criminal offence of corrupt/improper exercise of police powers and privileges, introduced by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 exactly for malicious applying the power of the state by police officers, is prescribed by the parliament to lead to up to 14 years sentence for offending police officers. But that is not all.

There are two other important details about what MPECT have done in April 2018. The first detail is that if their guilt of deliberate misleading the court is proved, there is virtually zero chances to have probation term. Irresistible evidence of these criminal offences are – to no avail – being thrown by me at the faces of Merseyside Police’s ‘safeguards’ / decision makers for 9 months in a row. I need to state it loud and clear: when the ex parte AFO application was made in relation to my bank accounts in April 2018, the criminal offences have likely been committed by the police officers, which offences inevitably would lead to jail term for them as long as those are being proved. This is the first important point which one shall keep in mind when giving value to any actions of MPECT undertaken by them after April 2018 (and that effectively means any actions of them. After that initial AFO application, in which I was stated to sell a fake airline ticket to Nigeria for £750 pounds and three fake (non-existent) cars on eBay for £6,000-8,000, the approach of MPECT had ‘urgently changed’ to the new one, and they started to assert that, albeit they now recognize I did not sell fake airline ticket to Nigeria (despite of what they claimed to the court by direct words of the application), they have “very serious concerns over regulatory compliance of my FCA-licensed payment business”, which causes them, bright and shining police officers, to ‘play regulator’ and waste public funds for it where the regulator did not act. In their panic attack they have referred the ‘case’ to the FCA ‘for consideration of taking action’. The FCA – as one would expect from the same public body, let alone regulator of such a level of competence as the FCA – has thrown it as a brick. But they can’t follow suit because their ‘investigation’ is the only their leverage against my complaints and the risk of bearing responsibility over criminal offences of them themselves alleged in my complaints.

The second important point is that this criminal offence was not done merely by the officer who physically filed to the court the fabricated AFO application – Detective Constable [Officer 5]. Before being filed that application was reviewed and approved by much higher officer, Detective Chief Inspector [Officer 2] (who, as I have observed so far, is an untouchable member of Merseyside Police regardless of what he commits). Because this AFO application was made under absolutely novel legislation enacted on 31st January 2018 (two months before the application), and because the amount of it was enormous (for the levels of Merseyside Police, of course), because Financial Investigation Unit (“FIU”), of which DC [Officer 5] and his sergeant – DS [Officer 4] – were part, always act in collaboration with and by referral from at least one another department (in this case Cyber Crime Unit, “CCU”) it is plain that the whole investigation team (both FIU and CCU) and their direct management (DCI [Officer 2]) were participating in knowingly preparing and / or informed approving of that fabrication. That is around 7-10 officers at the least. The investigation started 8 months before AFO and they cannot say “everything happened too fast”, they had much time to give value to all available to them evidence, yet, after 8 months of thinking (and 8 months of knowing I operate regulated and large financial companies across the EU and around the world), they have filed absolutely fabricated application to the court, ramantly lying in each and every paragraph of it, effectively representing me as a ‘shady and mysterious Russian’ without any business footprints and participating in primitive, low-level and low-amounts frauds while inexplicably holding large amounts of monies in my UK bank accounts and - as they knew perfectly but withheld from the court - moving millions inside the UK like nothing happened and sponsoring Liverpool FC simultaneously with the ‘committal of £750 fake airline ticket fraud’ portrayed by them to have been done by me. The conclusion is that the whole investigation team may have committed inevitably imprisonable criminal offence by conscious preparing and filing that initial court application
after which all the events - 'serious international investigation' and all that fancy stuff on the cost of public funding row the two years in a row started, which, on surface suggested they were 'confused' and 'were not aware of the facts' which were, in reality, deliberately withheld from the court. That pretence of 'being very confused investigators' was, I believe, their initial "plan B" in case I, despite of their expectation that I would just never appear again, would come up after 2 years of absence with my concerns. However soon they had realized that "plan B" was non-viable, due to my subsequent challenging them with showing them explicit slips in their false pretences to the court: my draft of complaint presented to them by me on 24th July 2018 was explaining in a detailed format where their false pretences to the court were contradicting to each other and, thus, were non-viable for creating the picture of 'clumsy investigators'. I do believe that they are not clumsy but rather are criminals in public office, who are sitting in the public office and abusing the power of the state as their personal weapon and armor. For the believed by me orchestrator of this serious corruption - Detective Inspector [Officer 1] - the power of the state appears to be just his personal toy, which he uses as he wants to: at the outset of the events he was merely a Sergeant, being promoted right in the course of the investigation to Inspector and Senior Investigating Officer, becoming a powerful manipulator whose tentacles reach out now the management of the police force, with whom he ran to meet and make 'pre-arrangements' right after learning about my final decision to file a complaint and whom he now directed into suicidal blatant cover-up of his serious corruption.

After AFO: extortion, pressure to withdraw from intention to file a complaint by intimidating to continue the 'criminal' 'investigation'

After I learned about the AFO in relation to a smaller amount on my UK company’s bank account (but not on personal accounts) and – only through intensive and repeated requests to provide the basis of the AFO application – I obtained a copy of it with 2-month delay. MPECT were extremely reluctant to send this document to me or my staff, despite of having interviewed the director of the affected by AFO company and despite of being obliged to send it right after obtaining AFO, on the same day, not two months later, let alone to give copy of it to the director of my company when he chased them up and insisted on meeting. The previous chapter explains why they were so reluctant: they understood it may come up that they have committed imprisonable criminal offences. Having read that application and – as they were afraid - realising it is a deliberate and rampant fabrication, I informed MPECT on 24th July 2018 about my intent to file a complaint about their actions, if they will not stop misconduct. On the same day I provided them with 59-page draft of my complaint, which largely addressed all fabrications of the AFO application, examples of which I provide. That was the day when investigation team understood that what was believed by them to be likely an 'easy kill', a 'thrilling experiment' and a 'little play with big power at the hands' turned to be something much different. That was, as I understand now, the 'no return' point where noble corruption has irrevocably mutated into rampant malice: it was now a 'self-defence' with the power of the state at the hands and a malicious exploitation of 'acting in the name of the state'.

The point where police officers understand that either they destroy the victim of their crime or the complaint of the victim destroys them, is the point where they inescapably become a most horrific reincarnation of malice which a member of public in a civil society can ever imagine and where the power of that malice is limited only by the powers of the public office they hold – the office of the UK police, in my case. I live in this state of things for more than 1.5 years and it has heavily impacted my psychological health, causing incredible damage to it, with 'safeguards' falling one after another like a house of cards.

Realising that their misleading of the court in April 2018 AFO application may land them straight to a jail term, in response to my challenge sent to them on 24th July 2018 (which
included the 59-page draft of a complaint), MPECT proposed, through ‘without prejudice’ discussions with my lawyer through their solicitor, on 26th July 2018 a humiliating “middle way” (exactly words repeated by the solicitor of MPECT both on 26th and 27th July 2018) offer which suggested that I would leave them £606,000 by way of not opposing the AFO and (by inference) withdraw from my intention to file a complaint, in exchange for them applying their discretion to lift the ‘criminal’ ‘investigation’ and release larger (multi-million) amounts of my own monies on the other accounts of me in the UK jurisdiction. I rejected this ‘generous offer’ made by those individuals (MPECT), who I believe to be the criminals in public office, acting as armed bandits on a rural road.

Since then, to ‘reverse-justify’ committed by them misleading of the court by the wholly fabricated initial AFO application in April 2018 (and, of course, to disguise subsequent attempt of applying to me unlawful pressure in July 2018), ECT have applied all their public funding and available resources to develop an ‘investigation’ against my UK business, codenamed "Operation Kobus". They have put up as much dust as possible so as to ensure that anyone who hears about my complaints, will be prejudiced by the knowledge of the existence of the ‘investigation’ by ‘bright’ ‘police’ ‘officers’. So far their bet on prejudice has been a winning strike, with rare exceptions.

**Lifehack:** if you are a police officer and you have blatantly committed an imprisonable criminal offence - do not panic. Instead, follow the simple steps:

- a) give the status of suspect to the victim of your criminal offence;
- b) say "You are a suspect. It is a large and complex criminal investigation. We will need very much time to make things clear";
- c) make internal arrangements within the Force that no one ever will investigate the complaints of the victim just in case he will be clever enough to understand you just extend time farther and farther from the moment of your misconduct, to make him distracted, to complicate investigation of yourself and to shift agenda;
- d) involve into cover up of your misconduct (and into the misconduct itself) as many officers of the Force as possible so that it really becomes an unbeatable network inside the Force which will never investigate large layer of its officers "just because that pitiful suspect naively complained";
- e) profit.

**My complaints against Merseyside Police... to Merseyside Police**

Me and the person whom I believe to be the mastermind of serious corruption in Merseyside Police – Senior Investigating Officer (“SIO”) Detective Inspector (“DI”) [Officer 1] – both agree, in general, in the logical viability of the presented above formula. It works and it works very well. I applause, in my mind, to my opponent every single day. He is a very smart man, and he benefits from this malicious attack very well: he was promoted from merely a sergeant to SIO DI right in the course of Operation Kobus, and now has connections across the whole management of the Force, probably being the most influential officer of his Force.

The only small problem that he has is that the victim of his corruption (me) has seen and - unwittingly - interacted with such ‘smart men’ before and can see and understand, highlight what DI SIO [Officer 1] does and why he does it. I can highlight what I see, but the inescapable question which circles in my mind is **whether is there anyone to listen.** So far I did not find in the UK many (if any), but I am satisfied to believe that I faithfully tried to go through all instances and do everything step-by-step, before reaching the current stage which I consider to be an apoage of my efforts to wake up the system of justice of the UK. I **can’t speak louder.** I hope that someone will start to listen to what I say and will try to understand that seriously, for the first time in 2 years. In the modern world the corruption
mostly flourishes not in the silence but in where there is no one to listen. And this is exactly the situation I face now in the UK for the second year in a row.

I am not a ‘bully person’ and I certainly did not search for conflicts. Not because I cannot participate in those but because I know that if I start to participate in one, it will cost a big price for everyone including me myself, as it is the nature of my character that I always go until the logical end, which may easily cost me more resources and damages than often is the subject of the conflict: once the trigger is switched, nothing can stop it, until satisfaction of my principles, of which I myself am very afraid because unstoppable following principles often causes steps which appear to be irrational and self-harming. Like, for example, challenging the powerful ranks of a police force of 4,000 officers, reaching step-by-step the management of that Force and, by my own steps, allowing the ultimate organizer of serious corruption (DI [Officer 1]) to effectively call them his partners in his – what it inescapably is - personal vendetta against me. Or, for example, organizing by myself the public messages as the current one, likely burying alive my own (costed me very hard work) financial career for the sake of justice for a bunch of provincial liars in the public office, whom I never wanted to deal with in my life and who appeared in it like a meddling ‘dung fly’.

I faithfully, patiently and explicitly tried to explain this ‘fly’ that I do not want to deal with it. On 24th July 2018 I have put an ultimatum that if the misconduct of alleging me having sold a fake airline ticket to Nigeria (and all that nonsense stuff) will continue, I will make a complaint within 10 days. This might look not very peaceful, but it was the only way to surely wake up the consciousness of these people to the highest level and get access to it. What was the highest level of conscious of them, is described above: continuation of bandit approach with proposal of a “middle way”, blatant extortion of monies and applying unlawful pressure to withdraw from my intention to file a complaint. At least I tried.

But even after that I continued my faithful attempts to be extremely flexible. Instead of filing complaint in August 2018, I have informed investigation team that I want first to meet them, to see the faces of people whose careers might be affected by my complaint, to give them ability to provide me with explanations. The same month, in August 2018, I have sent them a draft of proposed by me apologies to be signed by the investigation team. After receipt of my draft MPECT, again doing so through their solicitor, stated that they do not like my draft of apologies. On my explicit proposal to provide then their own draft of apologies they failed to provide any.

In September 2018 I have attended interview with two officers of MPECT – DC [Officer 5] and DS [Officer 4], both officers of FIU. One of them – DC [Officer 5] – tried to reply my questions and admitted that, when filing the initial AFO application in April 2018, MPECT knew about my business and my FCA licence, while portraying me as a person without any business footprints and as someone who sold fake airline ticket to Nigeria for £750. He stated that “being licensed does not mean being legitimate”. He had big troubles in replying my question why then did MPECT state in the application I have no business footprints. The best I could get from him was his counter question “I do not remember, did I state so in my application?”. Well, he did.

His colleague and superior, DS [Officer 4], acted differently. He rejected to reply each and every question from me and even intercepted several times DC [Officer 5] when he tried to reply to me. It appears that discussing Operation Kobus is a more pleasant topic for DS [Officer 4], in which he feels himself much more comfortable. I understand why: he and his fellow sergeant (as he was by then) [Officer 1] understand that many questions about misleading the court in April 2018 can simply send them to jail, if ever those are answered. So they fight for never being asked those questions.
Albeit not very much, but I still hoped to receive some apologies after my interview in September 2018 for which I, having autoimmune disease, have travelled thousands of miles for the first time in two years after the onset of the disease. I replied around 350 questions during that 6 hours interview and left the UK. But instead of apologies, in a 3 weeks time I got from MPECT application for AFO extension: the ‘investigation’ needed more time to ‘clarify the things’. Of course – until the 1-year term for filing complaint will be missed.

In December 2018 I have again offered MPECT another interview with me, indicating that this time I want to see Detective Sergeant (as he was by then) [Officer 1] and Detective Inspector / Senior Investigating Officer [Officer 9]. That proposal of interview was explicitly rejected.

On 4th March 2019, recognizing that less than 2 months are left before the 1-year deadline to file a complaint for misleading AFO of 23rd April 2018, I officially informed MPECT about my final decision to file a complaint before expiration of the deadline, in the last week of March 2019, and offered them again to meet me, by way of conducting an official interview of me, and state to me their case on my accusations. That proposal was, again, explicitly rejected. In the same email reply MPECT stated that they do not want anymore to receive any emails from me directly and asked to address any communications to their lawyer (solicitor of the Force).

In the last week of March 2019 – the week when I promised MPECT to file my complaint, Senior Investigating Officer of Operation Kobus – DI [Officer 9] – resigns. Albeit MPECT described it on one occasion as “he retired”, I have little doubt it was directly related to my deadline of filing the complaint: out of the whole team he was the only decent person who had decided not to participate in the vendetta against the complainant by abuse of police powers, the power of the state. After his resignation the person whom I called, in my letters to MPECT since August 2018, to be the mastermind of misconduct, DS [Officer 1], had become, the new SIO of Operation Kobus, being promoted to Inspector from Sergeant. Ironically, that appointment as the new Senior Investigating Officer happened on 23rd April 2019, exactly one year after the misleading AFO, which is believed by me to amount to criminal offences of him and his team, was filed. Noble corruption, of course, pays back, as does serious corruption, until the system opens its eyes. The question is always whether the system has such intention and capacity to, and how much suffering and efforts are needed to reach that target for a victim of the corruption.

Due to organizational reasons, I filed my complaint on 17th April 2019, as opposed to the initially intimated by me deadline of the end of March 2019, because at the last moment it was decided to add a Queen’s Counsel, Chris Daw, to the process of preparing it, the decision which I will never regret about, as his leading light led me to the heights of understanding of the misconduct regulations ever after. That complaint of 17th April 2019 was addressing the fabricated AFO application of MPECT dated 23rd April 2018 and is available as the document “The initial misleading AFO application of 23rd April 2018”. The complaint was made in form of a witness statement by a senior lawyer of a leading legal firm, Mr Oliver Wright of JMW Solicitors LLP, which is a material fact because those 21 pages of complaint are not just my words but the words of a senior lawyer who started the document by phrase “I WILL SAY” (which is a standard form for written witness statements). A senior lawyer, who once was named by The Times as “Lawyer of the Week” in the UK, listed on 21 pages of my complaint enormous amount of misleading points and fabrications in a 3-page AFO application of 23rd April 2018. Upon receipt, the complaint was industriously stonewalled by Detective Chief Inspector [Officer 3] of PSD, whom I believe to be accomplice of DI [Officer 1] and DCI [Officer 2]. I will not go into much details, to not overweight my already voluminous public letter but, in short, the behaviour of PSD was such
that, if you come to a mother of a son and ask her to act as a witness in the court against her son, you would see somewhat similar: albeit she might not tell you directly what she thinks about you and your proposal, her reaction will make you understand that you have knocked a very wrong door with a very wrong request. If there was any evolution in my interaction with PSD then that was that, at first, it was rampantly violating every possible complaints regulation, turning later to applying a ‘tick box’ exercise with those regulations, when being challenged by my lawyers on those rampant violations. “Oh, you need this obligatory step from the regulations? There you go! Check!” and so on, with the simple ultimate (never explicitly stated but obvious) message: “Mr Sharipov, no one ever will investigate your complaints, no one is interested in what serious corruption you report, calm down and concede; the system is ringed, and we exist not for what you (and the public) think we do. You have lost”. And, to a large extent, they were right: the system is ringed; a smart Sergeant ([Officer 1], who is now Inspector) has ringed in my case the whole UK system of safeguards. That is why you read this.

On 7th August 2019 I filed a complaint against DCI [Officer 3] in his capacity of the decision maker (Appropriate Authority, in legal language) of PSD on my first complaint of 17th April 2019 made against MPECT, after further supplying him on 18th July 2019 with prima facie (obvious) evidence of misleading the court by DC [Officer 5] (see the third example from the document “Evidence of serious corruption in Merseyside Police: 2018-2020”, which represents prima facie case of perjury under oath). In that same letter of 18th July 2019 I have officially informed him that if he would turn a blind eye even on such irresistible evidence of serious corruption and would not undertake actions to recuse from Operation Kobus at least DC [Officer 5] alone, I would complain against him for wilful enabling serious corruption. He simply ignored my request, replying on 23rd July 2019 by a misplaced letter which even did not mention neither my request itself nor the reason of why he rejected it.

On 24th July 2019 – again, to not miss the 1-year term – I filed my second complaint against MPECT, about the extortion of monies and applying unlawful pressure to me, that happened in the end of July 2018 after I informed MPECT about my intention to file a complaint.

Albeit at that time DCI [Officer 3] was already on notice of my upcoming complaint against him, in the best (observed by me so far) traditions of Merseyside Police he has allowed himself to handle that second complaint against MPECT, despite of plain conflict of interest arising from my notified to him complaint of me against him as a believed by me to be corrupt decision maker on my first complaint. Unsurprisingly, on 14th August 2019 he rejected to even record that new complaint as a separated one, stating that “there is nothing new”: he, in his ‘objective analysis’, concluded that extortion of monies from an international businessman and applying to him unlawful pressure to withdraw from his intention to file a complaint by way of effectively threatening to continue the criminal investigation, is “substantially the same events with the initial complaint of 17th April 2019” which addressed rampant misleading the court by MPECT. It was plainly not, but such ‘merging’ allowed to avoid finding new excuses why this new complaint of 24th July 2019 shall not be investigated.

On 13th August 2019, as result of me obtaining (through the court, on 14th June 2019) copies of the ten ex parte Production Orders applications (for the information about me) made by MPECT in the course of Operation Kobus and arising from that obtained documentation conclusion by me of the culture routine misleading the courts by MPECT, I filed my third complaint, this time addressing misleading in those ex parte applications. The complaint was addressing the conduct of the officers concerned within a dozen of ex parte applications and consisted of 53 pages of analysis of what I believe to be an established approach of MPECT to mislead the courts on an industrial scale. That complaint of 13th August 2019, together with the complaints of 17th April 2019 and 24th July 2019, form my three primary
complaints against MPECT which, together, address most of their misconduct in relation to me on different occasions and circumstances.

As I progressed with my complaints, affecting bigger and bigger parts of ‘infrastructure’ of my opponent – SIO DI [Officer 1], – he progressed, as I believe, too, by widening of his network of serious corruption within Merseyside Police, that allowed him to show new and new ‘magic tricks’ unseen before. That complaint of 13th August 2019 has become subject of “make it disappear!” trick: like a trained magician, by a gracious movement of his hands, he arranged the complaint against him and his team to simply disappear from all radars for 3 months. During these 3 months I have sent 10 reminders (that is, ten), being either ignored by PSD each time, or receiving ‘confused’ replies in which PSD officers were pretending they have difficulty in understanding what I am speaking about. Only after 3 months of follow ups and in response to tenth reminder, on 15th November 2019, PSD had finally confirmed that it had received my complaint of 13th August 2019 and started reading it. As ludicrous it may sound, they used the fact of the complaint being 53-page long, as an excuse of why they recognize for the first time it has been ever received, 3 months after it being filed. To put that into the legal context of misconduct regulations, the deadline for the complaints to be confirmed as recorded, is 28 calendar days. Confirming that a complaint is recorded is an obligation of PSD and it does not require the time to read and understand it in full details. Neither do 53 pages of text in Arial-11 font require 94 days to be read. But because PSD is so dedicated to cover up MPECT, the unimaginable tricks keep happening. One thing is clear from the conduct of PSD: PSD of Merseyside Police will never investigate MPECT. By that reason I have already informed PSD that I will file a separate complaint against its management, for continuous stonewalling of my complaints throughout 2019 year and other unlawful actions. Just like, after seeing a never ending fountain of corruption, I do not accept authority of Merseyside Police as a whole in conducting any investigations into me, as the person who highlighted serious corruption in the ranks up to the Chief Constable, I do not accept authority of its PSD in investigating my complaints against the believed by me network of serious corruption in Merseyside Police. On the other hand, I welcome any ‘investigations’ into me as long as those can be performed by any officers of integrity – after transferring Operation Kobus to another police force, with which I can fully cooperate, and I see it the only possible way for my complaints about network of serious corruption being investigated by the (“IOPC”) under strict public scrutiny (as it turns, that is the only mode in which the IOPC has chance to properly pursue the public interest when dealing with serious corruption).

The role of the IOPC

The picture would be not full if I omitted to mention the role of the IOPC. Because the outrageous failures of the IOPC – the safeguard of police misconduct regulations – were so deep and lamentable, I have dedicated a separated public letter to the IOPC called “FAO Director of the (lamentable) IOPC”.

To describe the performance of the IOPC in short, I could never believe that such level of incompetence can exist in the UK government bodies trusted to handle such a serious matter as corruption in law enforcement. The impression which I got from interaction with the IOPC is that they are not prepared to deal with serious corruption and are trained more to handle – much more frequent, I understand – complaints on discrimination and reckless / dangerous conduct of the specific officers in field. With my complaints about serious corruption’s network being categorized in a repeated rubber-stamp exercise as ‘of the lowest seriousness’ I felt myself like if I approached an ice cream shop with the question if they have a medication from cancer. I am not even sure if they understood what about was the discussion (if my monologs can be called a discussion) – the stage of attempt to find a proper way of reaction on what I brought up appears to be not even reached. On the bright
side, assessor of the IOPC dealing with my complaints was always fast in sending a copy
and paste – and very kind – letter on each complaint / appeal. At least one gets
understanding of the IOPC’s uselessness when it comes to serious corruption, fast after
contacting it.

Not every decision of PSD can be appealed to the IOPC and so far the IOPC was making
two kind of decisions on my complaints: first, it was categorising my complaints to one of the
4 categories of seriousness (out of which only one was allowing the Force to investigate
itself by itself – of course, the lowest one, the one which I was getting during 8 months of
virtually screaming with irresistible evidence there is a network of serious corruption and
multi-million damages), and, second – considering my appeals on the suspension of
investigation of my complaints by PSD until the conclusion of Operation Kobus (the excuse
used by PSD to never investigate my complaints). Refusal of the latter appeals was a wholly
unlawful decision, albeit its roots are based on the fact that PSD have misled and withheld
the information from the IOPC and the CPS (who also has a role in decision making process
if the complaints should be investigated) and that decision was – de facto – successfully
challenged by me through the High Court proceedings recently: PSD and the IOPC
conceded to unlawfulness of that decision before the proceedings were finished, and now
are trying to put on a good face like if they did not lose these proceedings, due to fulfilling my
claim before any substantial hearing in the High Court took place.

Significantly, based on the information about the decision making process of the IOPC which
I have seen from the document supplied by the IOPC to me in the High Court proceedings,
the only criterion used by them in categorizing the complaints by seriousness is existence of
the information of the complaint in the public domain. In other words, and as an extreme
element: if a police officer or a group of officers managed to commit some serious crime
very quietly, without raising public attention, it is automatically being categorised by the
IOPC as “the lowest seriousness”, no matter how serious is the allegation of malpractice.

Albeit the approach, where the publicity is the only criterion, appears to be a ludicrous one,
it also appears that the IOPC failed even in it: it was incapable to calculate few steps ahead
and could not consider that the level of allegations, the scale of the case is such that it would
inevitably reach public domain, not least because there were multiple proceedings started in
the High Court. Neither was it capable to, at the very least, predict that if ever the case would
reach the public domain, it might detonate and cause a considerable harm to the reputation
of policing if the complaints would be stonewalled and improperly handled before that
reaching, as, unfortunately, is the case with my complaints against the corrupt officers.

A good driver is not the one who bumps his car into a pole most softly but the one who also
avoids these bumps as much as possible. I was informing the IOPC about the risks of a big
scandal very explicitly since July 2019, providing it on 8th July 2019 with a very detailed and
well-structured analysis of the possibility of a multi-million international scandal with a
regulated by the FCA business destroyed into ground by the corrupt network in a regional
police force. It was not a ‘letter of a madman from the street’ which would be difficult to read
and understand, it was properly drafted and thought, let alone, being considered by those
who were supposed to understand the matters brought to them in explicit format as those
were related to their expertise – overseeing the police and maintaining the integrity of
policing.

For any logically thinking person seriousness of the issues addressed by the complaint
and the fact of the allegations of the complaint (non-)reaching the public domain are parallel
and independent from each other: albeit the fact of publicity should logically aggravate
importance of the complaint generally, it cannot create seriousness of it purely by itself,
neither can lack of publicity cause ability to disregard extreme, force majeure level of the
issue, such as the network of serious corruption of around 10 police officers and involving PSD (and now the management of the force). However, from the documents I had sight of, it appears that the assessors of the IOPC have only a binary fork instruction: “not in the public domain = no seriousness”. It is simply lamentable, and I do not wonder that serious corruption flourishes in the courtyard of such an oversight body: a cat who catches mice only when its owner watches, is a laughable guard. As a result, rather than acting as an independent safeguard against bad faith and deliberate turning a blind eye on serious corruption on the side of PSD, the IOPC effectively acted simply as a ‘shade’ of it, almost automatically agreeing with every decision of PSD: no information in the public domain so why bother and read anything / invest efforts to react properly? It is, of course, a very ‘smart’ approach for the IOPC assessor staff with whom I got to deal – because it creates an impression of work without actual work being done – but being applied in practice to live cases, it turns to be a horror scenario where the only safeguard against the ringed chain of corruption turned to be an imitation, a ‘dummy’ which appears to be existing and having any impact only until you start actually trying to get from it any sensible output / reaction.

The IOPC is a ‘911 telephone line’ for the cases of serious corruption in the UK police forces, where the internal safeguards are ringed / deliberately covering up; and no one in his or her life wants to call 911 in an urgency and hear a speaking robot, like I, effectively, had to do (despite of interacting with a human being: that staff happened to be impenetrable in her incompetence). As I have indicated in my public letter to the IOPC, such kind of ‘help’ has, in fact ‘worse than nothing effect’ because it simply does not work – why waste time and resources of the public and of the victims of corruption for their hopes and reliance on something so lamentable and useless?

I was opposing myself to a powerful corruption in Merseyside Police for a prolonged period of time and I was relying on the IOPC, relying very much. It has betrayed all my hopes and acted (and acts) merely as a speaking, incompetent and impenetrable ‘dummy’. I wish this ‘safeguard’ never existed. If you enter a serious fight and deeply rely on someone, the last thing you want is to see in the middle of the battle that this someone is actually shooting at your spine.

I leave the approach of the IOPC to my case for everyone’s judgement, as I do so with the level of incompetence within the IOPC highlighted in my public letter “FAQ Director of the (lamentable) IOPC”.

The role of the IOPC in this story is simple: would it do its job properly, this public message and much of the pain and sufferings and legal expenses caused to me would never exist, as would never the network of serious corruption in Merseyside Police reach such uncontrollable, unstoppable stage where it has taken control over and, effectively, tainting and compromising the Force’s whole management and critical decision making: seeing and demonstrating that there is no one to catch them, these malicious officers managed to widen their influence over the whole Force’s management. Albeit the core of corruption is lying among the members of Merseyside Police, it is the IOPC and the management of the Force who are ultimate enablers of that serious corruption and those who bear the responsibility over how far it managed to go before being highlighted by my public message, which would otherwise never exist. Paradoxically, and by the irony of life, applying a bizarre approach with publicity being the only criterion of seriousness of the complaints, the IOPC produced this damaging the UK policing publicity by way of leaving me no other choice but to – in the circumstances of impenetrable incompetence of itself – appeal to the public. From the fact that it damages my own reputation and career very much, one can easily believe I tried by all means to avoid that step and that it does not make any pleasure to me.
My interaction with the management of Merseyside Police

As result of my interactions with PSD of Merseyside Police and the IOPC, by November 2019 it has become explicitly clear that I am caught into a frustrating (and shocking) trap between deliberate cover-up of serious corruption by PSD and impenetrable incompetence and ignorance of the IOPC.

The basic logic shows that if there is serious corruption’s network in a police force, and it includes anti-corruption department of it as well, there must be other path routes how to remind the Force about existence of the Code of Ethics of the police – an official document maintained by the College of Policing which stipulates fundamental principles of the policing, and to which all police forces are referred in their daily decisions making. A very plain and not complicated analysis suggested that, if the whole decision making system of the entity appears to be tainted, the only correct addressee of further challenges and requests can be the management of the entity – the management of Merseyside Police, as the last instance.

Such basic logic is actually perfectly supported by the internal procedures of the Force which include a policy – special document describing the official procedure – called “Service Confidence”. That policy charges the management of the Force with the positive (requiring action when there is a need) duty of the management of the Force to maintain integrity of the Force when there is a serious concern over integrity of a member of the Force, by way of deciding if such a member shall be suspended or recused from his current duties even despite of no investigation of his conduct being performed by whatever reasons or if such investigation does not result into dismissal.

In my letters to the management of the Merseyside Police I have requested a very simple thing: while repeatedly welcoming any investigations into myself, all I asked about was to recuse from such investigations the officers whose committal of criminal offences against me is supported by me with irresistible evidence, as that creates inescapable biases and prejudice against me. As the ideal scenario I have requested that Operation Kobus is moved to another Force, integrity of the officers of which could not be questioned by me, which would only benefit the public interest.

Very helpfully, the same “Service Confidence” policy, which I am speaking about above, describes the test to be applied by the decision maker – Assistant Chief Constable of the Force:

"The test of whether there are ‘Serious Concerns' about an individual’s integrity will be based on an assessment of all the intelligence and evidence, including source sensitive material. The evidence must establish that it is more probable than not that the individual’s integrity is in question."

It should be underscored that this is not the test of the balance of probabilities of misconduct having been committed because “more probable than not” is related to the “integrity [being] in question”. “Question” is a test of suspicion, means, the test is whether there is, more probable than not, a suspicion that integrity of a police officer is compromised. No further consideration is required to be applied under this official policy: the integrity of a police officer is either in question or not. If it is, the officer must be recused from the duties exercising of which may put integrity of the policing into disrepute. The spirit of the Code of Ethics is very clear in that matter, having in 13 pages of it more than 40 mentions of such words as integrity, honesty, fairness and impartiality. Such duties from which recusal is to be inescapably done, for example, include participating in a criminal investigation against the complainant who claims with irresistible evidence of criminal offences committed against that complainant by the very same police officer concerned.
All is very beautiful and shining up to now with this official policy: it is an excellent example of another, **additional** (to the IOPC) safeguard of the system, aimed to underpin fairness and integrity in policing – which are put into the main decision making principle by the Code of Ethics by the UK Police - in those cases in which PSD and the IOPC have failed. That – the beauty of the system - is always the case with the UK system – a well-developed and thoughtful one, as was indicated in my important safeguard in the beginning of current letter.

The problems begin sometimes when all these legal structures of safeguards face the real world and the real world’s decision makers, which, it strikes me much, are sometimes either impenetrably incompetent (as with the IOPC ground staff who are trusted to deal with the incoming flow of complaints) or blatantly and deliberately covering up the very serious wrong (as PSD). Or recklessly and consciously ignorant to the issue of rotten integrity as, it appears to be the case, with the management of Merseyside Police.

On 18th November 2019 I have sent Assistant Chief Constable Critchley of Merseyside Police a 32-page letter explaining full situation with my complaints and highlighting the observed by me network of serious corruption in Merseyside Police, providing him with the same irresistible evidence of that serious corruption as in my public analysis "Evidence of serious corruption in Merseyside Police: 2018-2020". In my letter I requested ACC Critchley to recuse the officers concerned from investigation the complainant – me – due to the reason of obvious biases of them against me arising from their committal of criminal offences against me, which are reported and complained about only by one person in the world – me myself. In addition to it ACC Critchley was supplied with copies of my three primary complaints described above.

What decision has the third highest manager of Merseyside Police made after reading irresistible evidence of deliberate misleading the courts and, likely, committal of criminal offences by his subordinates? It must be cited and forged somewhere in granite, as a reminder on what creates a basis for serious corruption to flourish inside the system:

> "My decision is that the investigation will continue to be undertaken by [the officers concerned] and the current investigation structure will remain.

> *In making this decision I believe that it is … ethical, being in line with the Code of Ethics for policing and is what the public would expect me to do.*

> *I am satisfied that my officers … [are acting] in a way that is in line with the high standards of quality I expect and set for my investigation teams …*."

That is where the thoughtful legislation and regulations of the UK meet the sad reality in which those are being sometimes applied with cynicism of the highest degree: ACC Critchley was provided with **irresistible evidence** of committal of criminal offences by the officers in "his investigation teams". The test for the need of taking a managerial action and, at the very least, recusing them from dealing with the investigation against the victim (and the only witness and complainant) of these criminal offences of the police officers, was "**whether there is a question of their integrity rather than not**", which is a test of suspicion of police officers having acted dishonestly (not even a question of suspicion of the officers committing a criminal offence, evidence of which, in fact, I had supplied).

Assistant Chief Constable Critchley is – as he stated by himself in his response letter – a qualified PIP 3 and PIP 4 Senior Investigating Officer and is, no doubt, a **very** clever person. He is well qualified to connect the dots, and in his response he explicitly confirmed that he has read all my complaints and evidence. In addition to those he has been provided with my 32-page letter of 18th November 2019 which highlighted the issue of the network of serious
corruption and biases against / injustice to me as a person who has discovered and reported it and is being attacked for doing so. ACC Critchley, certainly, has connected the dots and understood what is going on, as any intelligent person would do on his place. According to the internal policy of the Force it was his direct obligation to consider the issue of integrity of the officers whose committal of criminal offences is supported by irresistible evidence, as was his direct and positive duty to react appropriately.

What ACC Critchley did instead is a monument of reckless and deliberate cover up of serious corruption. That monument was described by me in my subsequently filed official complaint against him with the following words:

[Assistant Chief Constable Critchley] wilfully and knowingly used the power of his high position to maintain circumstances, which would suggest any further victims of serious corruption and misconduct of the police officers that they will be investigated by the very same police officers whose corruption they highlight, regardless of how obvious is the evidence of that corruption, effectively implementing a ‘punishment policy’ against any complainants of serious corruption within Merseyside Police, which I can describe as follows:

“Do not highlight / report observed by you serious corruption and misconduct of police officers if you do not want to have serious problems to be created by those officers, as no one will investigate your complaints until they – the corrupt officers you complained of – will exhaust all attempts to destroy, frazzle or discredit you using the power of the state as their personal weapon of punishment. The force’s management will fully endorse this.”

If one commits a wilful cover up of serious corruption with words “this is what the public would expect me to do” that makes it only more cynical but not legitimate. Likewise, when being presented with irresistible evidence of misleading the courts, stating that this “is in line with the high standards of quality I expect and set for my investigation teams”, makes it only a more rampant bluffing but not a legitimate decision making process.

It is my heartfelt belief that a high-ranked manager of the police force fully endorsing serious corruption, irresistible evidence of which is provided, becomes a point of public concern much bigger than the endorsed by him serious corruption itself, simply because if a manager cannot appropriately deal with the issue / risk of serious corruption, fully endorsing it, how can he or she be trusted to run the whole police force of 4,000 officers? How can such a person be trusted to deal with most delicate situations in other cases, with much lesser evidence of serious corruption and / or much less (than me) capable to defend themselves victims of it, participate in vetting processes of the system and form critical part of it, if such a striking tolerance to the issue of serious corruption is demonstrated?

In parallel with my challenging of ACC Critchley, by citing my letter to him, I did the same challenging of Deputy Chief Constable Serena Kennedy and Chief Constable Andy Cooke of Merseyside Police. I did so in recognition that all anti-corruption safeguards in Merseyside Police, including the three highest managers of it, who, according to own internal police of the Force called “Service Confidence” are responsible for maintaining integrity of the Force, are likely to be, in fact, nothing but a ‘house of cards’ which can’t stay against the organized corruption inside it, the corruption which is controlled and orchestrated by a talented orchestrator DI [Officer 1] who managed to cover all layers and decision making branches of the Force by his influence, through involving all of them into his corrupt games against me, as the only person in the world who highlights his dangerous nature and involvement in criminal offences, victim of which I am. Unsurprisingly – but nevertheless frustratingly – my challenges to DCC Serena Kennedy and Chief Constable Andy Cooke met full and
tenacious ignorance, which can only mean full endorsement of ACC Critchley’s decision to turn a blind eye on serious corruption. This allows me to conclude that there is currently no person in Merseyside Police’s decision-making system who would be capable (and have desire) to preserve the integrity of the Force and who considers his or her duty to the public to obey with the Code of Ethics.

In full line with all the above, in the High Court proceedings (which are ongoing now) in relation to recusal of the officers concerned Merseyside Police have paid £12,000 of public funds to a Queen’s Counsel and solicitor to state that biases of the police officers are not a proper reason for their recusal from investigation and the committal by them of criminal offences (even when considered at the highest) is not a proper basis for suspecting them having biases anyway. The only question which stands here is what relation all this – very interesting, of course – position has to the Code of Ethics and own policies of the Force.

Conclusions

One might think that my current letter is being prepared to highlight the believed by me serious corruption of MPECT’s officers. But that would be, at the very least, an inaccurate conclusion. It is my belief that corruption of such level, which was faced by me in the beginning of this story, was ought to be dealt with through proper safeguards of the system. This – the wholesale failure of all possible safeguards I relied on as a member of public – is what my public message is about.

My current letter, while certainly representing a request for help in my fight against serous corruption’s network in Merseyside Police, is also, and to the same extent, a signal to the UK’s public that the system of safeguards against the corruption in the UK law enforcement has failed and did so critically deeply, at least, in my case. What has started from a routine – however outrageous it was even by itself – case of a group of officers misleading the court in the initial £1.577 million account freeze ex parte application, has developed into something much bigger. I am speaking here not about the fact that, to cover up and disguise the initial criminal conduct / misconduct of their own, these police officers have wildly inflated the list and the depth of their fabricated allegations against me, transformed my life into horror of dealing with malicious and prejudiced officers of a powerful public office, impacted other multi-million accounts of me, but about the fact that, however regretful are their own initial and continued corruption and malice, this story has caused appearance of an always growing bubble of bad faith, malice and misconduct that has swallowed into itself now the whole Merseyside Police’s decision making system into one big ‘tumor’. I am speaking now not merely about the rotten integrity of the lower- to medium-ranks officers of MPECT, from whom it all started, but about the anti-corruption body of the Force, about the management of the Force being tainted and compromised. Based on what I have observed, I do believe that it is all rotten, rotten from inside, from bottom to top, and consciously so, and I believe that I have provided irresistible evidence of it in the documents accompanying my current public message. I do believe that this regional Force, however many officers of integrity it may (and certainly does) employ, is compromised as a public body, because its critical element of decision making – the management of the Force – has proved to be tainted, as is demonstrated by my case.

On the other hand, I do believe that impenetrable incompetence of the IOPC – at least in the observed by me isolated area of its structures – as anecdotal and bizarre its demonstrated approach and level of incompetence may be - represents a real and critical danger to the UK system’s of justice, because the knowledge of its absolutely lamentable incompetence, ‘toothless-ness’ and blindness will inevitably underpin the bad faith in 43 police forces as long as the decision makers (assessors of the complaints) are confident in the incompetence
of the IOPC. I could observe on my own example how in the beginning PSD of Merseyside Police was panicky afraid to refer my complaints to the IOPC: the idea of someone independent having look on their conduct causes faithful and horrifying panic on the side of Merseyside Police because they know the real level of that conduct. I could then observe how subsequent rubber-stamp exercises of the assessor of the IOPC (a lady on the very basic position with a very basic salary, but trusted to deal with very serious matters) in categorizing each and every my complaint, even those clearly indicating the well-documented allegations of existence of a network of serious corruption, as being of the lowest seriousness, had caused Merseyside Police to realise that they are untouchable: they are ‘investigating themselves’ and no one ever will intervene that process, because the IOPC is an inadequate safeguard, not trained well to face the issue of organized and professional serious safeguard which would involve PSD and the decision makers of the Force themselves. This is, I believe, why in response to my letter of 18th November 2019 to Assistant Chief Constable of the Force which listed my challenges, he virtually laughed in my face by his response, blatantly stating that this conduct is “in line with the Code of Ethics” and the “high standards”.

And he was logically – but not ethically, of course - right in doing so! If the IOPC acts as a useless dummy – who can stop the management of Merseyside Police in stating that black is the new white? In the world where the assessor of my complaints, Mrs A from the IOPC, is at the guard of integrity of the whole police force regardless of what kind of information reaches the IOPC, black will always be the white.

Currently I am in a state of war with the police officers of Merseyside Police who have committed against me criminal offences and have a very strong desire to avoid bearing criminal and civil (including multi-million damages) responsibility over that. Because the person orchestrating them – DI [Officer 1] – has good organizational and manipulation skills, he has involved into this confrontation – ultimately having place between me and him – the whole Force’s decision makers, from anti-corruption body to the management of the Force. As a result, now the whole management of the Force of 4,000 officers is targeted to destroy me, in the face of my eight complaints which now address seventeen officers of the Force including the three highest ranks of it, for being mixed up in serious corruption. It is probably 1/250 of the officers of this Force and 1/50 – two percent – of its detectives. A bit mockingly – thanks to the lamentable IOPC with the impenetrable incompetence of its staff – those complaints are handled by Merseyside Police itself. I certainly do not like this feeling, but my public message is not about my feelings, my public message is about a monstrous formation inside the UK system which I observe and realise that it opposes itself not only to me, but to the whole public of the UK as well: one who consciously turns a blind eye on serious corruption, is deemed to consciously have given himself or herself an oath to oppose the public interest at the most critical and delicate moments of his or her career – and the more high-flying it is, the more disastrous is going to be the inescapable impact of that to the public interest now and in many cases in future, none of which – unlike my case – would ever reach the public domain and such scale of fighting the malice.

The question is whether the public is capable to see the monstrous formation I highlight and take the action where all safeguards have failed so far. The malice and corruption I oppose to for the second year in a row was flourishing in a bet that it will be left invisible and untouched forever. The feeling of safety is what makes the corruption grow horizontally and vertically, as it happened in my case. At the heart of every well-designed system of safeguards – such as the one of the UK – lies the desire of decision makers to do the right thing when time comes to make the important and critical decisions. As long as decision makers – such as ACC Ian Critchley, DCC Serena Kennedy and Chief Constable Andy Cooke of Merseyside Police – can cynically damage the public interest by enabling serious corruption and putting the imminent risk of disrepute for the integrity of policing under the
carpet while saying “this is what the public would expect us to do”, any system of safeguards will never work because viability of such system stands on the integrity of the decision makers, however well-designed it may be: as long as there is no integrity, the decision maker may simply state blatantly and deliberately at the moment X that “black is white”, act in accordance with that judgement, and that would be an inglorious end to any efforts invested into designing the system. There is no higher decision makers in Merseyside Police than the management of the Force and each of the three of them has failed to address serious corruption on my explicit challenge made on the basis of their own internal policy, with providing obvious and irresistible evidence of committal of criminal offences by the officers concerned, which, at the very least, safely surpassed the test of the need of recusal. At the same time, the IOPC is not a reliable safeguard for deliberate ‘failures’ of the management of the Force when they deliberately act dishonestly and in violation of the Code of Ethics of the UK Police, by all the reasons set out in my current message and in my open letter to the Director of the IOPC.

One can fight against malicious attack of a police officer or even of a group of police officers by appealing to the integrity of their police force, but the game is over before it started when there is no actual integrity and desire to maintain it on the side of the highest management of the Force: the fish rots from the head.

As any competent investigator knows, doing the wrong thing is usually not a binary one-time process, in which the person does the wrong and then never repeats it: the human’s brain is a logical function and so are human’s behavioural patterns. Once the wrong was done, it will be repeated again and again, with always growing amplitude. There is no person in the world who is not susceptible to doing the wrong, but what really differs people is how deeply they are in doing the wrong: for someone his or her wrong’s highest arch is a consciously wrongful parking made when rushing to an important meeting, while someone can kill a person to take the wallet. What differs people is not that some of them are ‘living angels’ and some are ‘living devils’ (albeit sometimes the latter can be true), but the arches of their self-tolerable “wrong” which they are ready to or may consciously make. The important element of this is that the arch of the wrong and the amplitude of the ‘self-acceptable wrong’ of a person always grows, and what differs people is the starting point of that growth and the speed of that growth: most of the people would never in their lives reach what the public considers to be a threshold of criminality or, let alone, a gross misconduct level of the wrong at which the integrity of the person is strongly criticised. The law enforcement systems are designed to motivate people to keep the speed of their naturally always growing amplitude of ‘self-tolerable wrong’ at a low pace and to never reach the critical thresholds. The publicity of law enforcement plays important role in that: learning from mistakes and punishments of the others, people get motivation to keep their speed of always growing arch of ‘acceptable wrongdoing’ low or approximated to zero. And that is important from the other side as well because once the wrong is highlighted to the public but left untouched, non-addressed, it will make the opposite effect.

I do faithfully believe that what I have observed gives me ability to logically conclude that the wrong made by at least 17 officers of Merseyside Police reported by me in my complaints, including the three highest officers of the Force, has surpassed the gross misconduct’s level of the wrong and part of that group of the officers has done it to the criminal level of wrong. The latter circumstance explains my confidence in the committal by the decision makers of the Force the acts of gross misconduct and misconduct in public office by wilful and deliberate turning a blind eye on irresistible evidence of the wrongdoing which in no case could allow them to conclude that there is absolutely no point of serious concern of integrity of the officers concerned, that was an obligatory trigger for them to react.
The readiness of Assistant Chief Constable Ian Critchley, the third highest rank in Merseyside Police, to consciously do the wrong thing by turning a blind eye on irresistible evidence of serious corruption, the readiness of the other two highest managers of the police force – Deputy Chief Constable Serena Kennedy and Chief Constable Andrew Cooke – to consciously and wilfully turn a blind eye on it, when being explicitly and repeatedly informed for a prolonged period of time about that wrong and rotting of the integrity of the Force from inside, is what allows me to conclude that Merseyside Police is a Force requiring the change of the whole vertical of the management – those three highest officers. I am stonewalled in my fight for fairness by these people in what has started as a confrontation with a group of low- to medium-level corrupt officers orchestrated by the person – DI [Officer 1] – whose high intellect allowed him to taint the whole Force in his personal vendetta against me. He, certainly, did not create the readiness of people in PSD of the Force and the management of the Force for doing the wrong because their arches of ‘self-tolerable wrong’ must have been already high enough to be used by him so easily and explicitly, but he masterfully exploited it, unfolding what was a ‘sleeping dragon’ of bad faith which I am now opposed to by being opposed to the whole Force. This powerful entity is a ‘monster’ ridden by a person skilfully directing it against me for 1.5 years in a row.

I do not have the power of the state to oppose this ‘dragon’. All I have is my good faith, my common sense and the power of the word. But the power of the word is useless without someone finally ‘opening ears’ and listening to what I am trying to tell for a prolonged period of time. After observing all possible safeguards of the UK system in this fight to have been failed, I have no other choice but to appeal directly to the public by my public message.

My public message can be described in the following words:

Dear public of the UK,

I am attacked by a maliciously acting corrupt group of public servants calling themselves “officers of Merseyside Police” and possessing the power of the state when pursuing their ulterior motives of escaping from responsibility over their gross misconduct and criminal conduct. In the face of all evidence of their wrongdoing being supplied by me, could you please help me to send them back to where they belong to and to where they deserve to be in? I do faithfully believe that part of them deserves to be in jail and the other part deserves to be dismissed on the basis of committing acts of gross misconduct and misconduct in public office. Before appealing to the public, I faithfully tried first to solve the issue peacefully and then to use all available to me, as a member of public, safeguards of the UK system and, after doing this, I have concluded that, by a combination of the reasons ranging from impenetrable incompetence and prejudice to deliberate turning a blind eye on serious corruption, those safeguards are not practicably usable when the malice is applied by a highly intellectual person inside the public office of the UK, who orchestrates the wrongdoing, and when there is a prejudice against the victim of his corruption, which arises from the status of ‘investigated person’ to whom, it appears to me, no safeguard in this country is capable to listen seriously. I will be thankful for your little help, but I count on it, to the big extent, not because I ask for it but because I do believe that these people – as I have informed them very explicitly and repeatedly, to no avail – have consciously and deliberately opposed themselves to the interest of the UK public, doing so in a hope that no one ever will know about that. I do believe that they were wrong in that expectation, and it has come time for them to pay the price of the betrayal and abuse of the UK public’s trust.

Sincerely yours, Ildar Sharipov